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Background: The success of medicine in the treatment of patients brings with it new challenges. More people live
on to suffer from functional, chronic or multifactorial diseases, and this has led to calls for more complex analyses
of the causal determinants of health and illness.
Methods: Philosophical analysis of background assumptions of the current paradigmatic model.
Results: While these factors do not require a radical paradigm shift, they do give us cause to develop a new
narrative, to add to existing narratives that frame our thinking about medical care. In this paper
we argue that the increased focus on lifestyle and shared decision making requires a new narrative of agency,
to supplement the narrative of “the patient”. This narrative is conceptually linked to the developing philosophy
of person-centred care.
Conclusions: If patients are seen also as “agents” this will result in a substantial shift in practical decisions: The development
and adoption of this narrative will help practitioners work with patients to their mutual benefit, harnessing the patients’
motivation, shifting the focus from treatment to prevention and preventing unnecessary and harmful
treatments that can come out of our preoccupation with the patient narrative. It will also help to shift
research efforts, conceptual and empirical, from “treating” and “battling” diseases and their purported
“mechanisms” to understanding complex contributing factors and their interplay.
Keywords: Agency, Causation, Context, Complexity, Lifestyle, Multifactoral diseases, Narratives, Patients, Person-
centred, Philosophy of medicineBackground
The story of the “patient”
The stories we tell ourselves and others, and the words
we use for this storytelling, are powerful [1, 2]. We know
very well the story of the “patient”. It is, roughly, this:
Some obnoxious thing from the outside, an invasive
agent like a germ, an accident or injury, or some
unknown inner cause like a hormonal dysfunction has
caused a disease and transformed a healthy person into
a patient. As a patient, this person is now a recipient of
medical help. He or she is a sufferer in various aspects:
He or she suffers from the disease – hence is a “patient”,
from the Latin passive tense “pati – to suffer”, and
“patiens – suffering”. The disease happens to him or her.
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suffering, or allowing, the treatment, which is done to
him or her by the medical profession, and, being a good
patient, he or she is patient enough to allow the treatment
to work – take the pills, do the prescribed exercises, wait,
or allow the surgery, etc. This story of the patient has been
the legitimizing story of medicine for a long time, and it is
surely the legitimizing narrative for all acute and emer-
gency cases, for relieving a patient from suffering in the
strict sense of the word. It is the narrative of the treatment
of emergencies and acute diseases and as such has done a
good job.
However, this narrative has grown outdated, at least
for all situations that are not emergencies. It’s not that it
has become wrong or useless. Rather, its success has
produced a new scenario which is in need of a new
story, a new narrative, to complement the patient
narrative. Now it is time for agents, or more preciselyle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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here in the philosophical sense of someone who is cap-
able of action and activity [3]. This includes making
choices and being aware of this capacity on part of the
agent, and being able to harness this capacity on part of
the medical profession, such as when a GP is suggesting
to a patient that she should quit smoking or that she
should drink less alcohol, and perhaps join an appropriate
therapy or self-help group. She would not be able to do
this, were she and her “patient” not implicitly considering
the “patient” as “agent” already. We are highlighting this
implicit understanding and are making a case for a better
usage of “agency”, both in the theoretical-scientific sense
and in the practical field. This new story is applicable, pre-
cisely because the old story was so successful. Where
many patients died in previous times, they now live,
thanks to this old patient narrative and thanks to the ef-
forts of medicine. Where preterm infants had a very slim
chance of surviving 30 years ago, they now do to become
patients later on [4]. Where approximately 50 million
sufferers of an influenza epidemic died 1918–1920 [5, 6],
we have much fewer casualties due to infectious diseases
in the West, because of the success of our narrative that
recommends hygiene and immunization, and likely,
because this narrative is embedded in the larger narrative
of social, political and economic progress [7].
This means: more people live on to suffer from diseases,
often multifactorial ones. This term is used to disguise our
inability to make out one single culprit as a cause that
could be combated, as the narrative requires. So we
normally choose one culprit out of an array, usually the
one that is supposed to be treatable most easily using the
narrative of acute and emergency medicine. Take back
pain as an example. Many people, patients and doctors,
assume that at some point people with sedentary
life-styles will get back pain or some other form of pain
syndrome. Patients expect that this should be treatable by
medications called “pain killers” for the very reason that
they are supposed to treat pain. The standard narrative of
emergency medicine is in operation and patients get treat-
ment or treat themselves, as patients, as passive recipients
of disease and treatment.
The new narrative of agents – Why we need it
The new narrative of the agent tells a different story. It
tells a story of an active agent who is spending way too
much time indoors with too little movement, is therefore
lacking essential stimuli and exercise, while at the same
time increasing tension and a pro-inflammatory
immunological situation through psychological stress,
lack of sleep, lack of natural antioxidants in the food and
increasing oxidative stress. While the standard narrative
of emergency and acute medicine is likely to pick out
one “major” culprit, such as inflammation by prescribingor buying pain killers, or bad posture and suggesting
some back training and so forth, the new narrative of
the agent is suggesting a different approach. Because
back pain is not a uni-causal “disease” but rather a
multifactorial event, where only the end result looks like
an acute, causal disease, it is a matter of choice and de-
pends on the narrative which one of these many “causes”
we pick. If the disease is acute and threatening, the
standard narrative might be indeed applicable. But if the
aim is to change the propensity for suffering pain, clearly
a different approach is needed. This is the new narrative
of the agent. This views the “patient” as an “agent” who
makes choices, behaves in a certain way and thereby
contributes to, but is also able to change, conditions that
lead to the susceptibility.
Note that the end product, the acute episode, will still
leave the “agent” in a state of “patient”, but everything
leading up to it might appear in a different light, if we
look at the person in terms of an “agent”: the lifestyle
choices he or she makes, whether to walk the stairs or
take the lift, whether to eat fresh and quiet, or fast and
junk food in a noisy environment, whether staying in
front of a computer screen indoors all day, or using the
breaks to sit outside in the sun, doing some exercise or
taking the bike for the shopping, or addressing the
friction in the relationship that may add to the psycho-
logical stress etc. The “agent” is someone who is active
and is taking active part in his or her “treatment”. One
aspect is shared decision making, which is part of
evidence based medicine and a good example of the new
narrative emerging [4]. But there is more to it. The
“agent” is also someone who is, ultimately, responsible
for his or her life in the sense that medical outcomes
and the development of diseases depend, at least in part,
on lifestyle choices taken earlier in life.
Crucially, the agent makes these choices in a social
context, that may either enable or inhibit the agent’s
capacity to make the choices that can contribute to
improving her situation in the future, such that a full
assessment of “the problem” and how best to address it
will involve moving beyond the search for medical
causes, to a consideration of the potentially unique cir-
cumstances of the suffering individual. [8] This may also
involve discussing with the agent what counts as the best
situation for her, as different agents may have different
values and priorities, and no amount of medical exper-
tise can make us experts on which trade-offs (for
instance, of risks and benefits in the context of specific
life choices) are the right ones for this person to make in
the context of her particular life goals. (So, a ballet
dancer suffering with asthma may resist an aggressive
steroid therapy to control the wheezing, if she believes
that the steroids may cause muscle weakness and fluid
accumulation, thus causing her dancing to deteriorate.
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ated risks, but we are in no position to tell her she is
simply wrong to prioritise maintaining the standard of
her dancing over “bringing the disease under complete
control.”) [9].
Thus, the narrative of “agency”, as we are using the term
here, is an integral component of the emerging philosophy of
“person-centred” care – an approach to healthcare influ-
enced by philosophical work on personalism, emphasizing
the “agency” and “inter-subjectivity” of all parties to the clin-
ical encounter [8–12]. Increasingly the language of “person--
centred health and social care” is being used to emphasise
the need to focus on the whole person, whose biological and
social aspects cannot be understood in isolation from each
other, but must be conceived as integral features of the
activity of living a whole life [8] – a philosophy emphasised
not only in academic work on health philosophy but, increas-
ingly, acknowledged as a much needed shift in thinking and
practice in health policy documents [13–15].
The top three killers, heart disease, cancer and side ef-
fects of drugs [16], are dependent on life-style choices at
least to a degree. For instance, combining four healthy
lifestyle factors can reduce premature mortality from
some of those diseases by 66%, in some even by 90%
[17, 18].
This new narrative of the “agent” is not meant to
replace the old narrative of the patient. It is meant to
complement it. As persons we have many aspects. In
some respects we are agents, in others patients. As
Aristotle understood, these aspects are not dichotom-
ous, and neither our agency nor our patient-hood can
be understood in isolation from each other or from
our social environment, as both are relational – we
act and are acted upon within a social context [19, 20].
Not only is man a “social animal”, but agency (and sub-
jectivity more broadly, including perception) are relational
aspects or properties of the human animal [19–21].
So the “agent” in the agent narrative is any one of us,
insofar as we aspire to increase our control of our lives,
and our lived environment, for our own long-term
benefit. The narrative of agency is applicable especially
in those situations where the problem is functional,
chronic or directly dependent on lifestyle, which will
mean in probably 70% or so of the case load in general
practice [22, 23].
Obstructing habits and the power of collective practice
What does this new approach do for us? The new narrative
points to ways where patients can become agents and do
something for themselves, whether it is some form of
self-care, or making different lifestyle choices, or taking re-
sponsibility for a good recovery, which sometimes also
means compliance with prescribed treatments. It acknow-
ledges patients’ agency. This agency we neglect at our ownperil. Patients remain agents up to their last breath. They
can resist or sabotage necessary treatments, but they very
often also know when a treatment does them more harm
than good. And agency can be harnessed. A type 1 diabetes
patient who understands about diabetes, its consequences
and danger, and who is treated as and sees himself or
herself as agent, will be more proactive in regulating blood
sugar. Someone at risk of getting diabetes type 2 can only
be “treated” professionally well by addressing his or her
agency, helping him or her to find a better nutritional pat-
tern, taking time to find out about the nutritional habits,
seeking out palatable alternatives and harnessing the power
of agency [24].
The major driver of the pervasive force of the narrative
of the patient is the availability of quick fixes. These are
mostly surgery and emergency measures in case of acci-
dents and emergencies, and often medications in case of
other medical problems. The upside is: it works well in
acute cases and emergencies. The downside is: it works
less well in chronic and functional problems and it perpe-
tuates the mythology of the patient in need of treatment.
This driver is powerful, because it is connected to and
dependent on the pharmaceutical industry and the health
sector at large, which makes up a large proportion of the
GDP in any developed economy. In Germany, for
instance, the health sector, including the pharmaceutical
industry, is the single largest industry [25, 26]. Therefore,
it will be very difficult to change the narrative. Changing
it, though, is important, even for our economies. Uphold-
ing the current patient narrative for chronic, functional
and lifestyle dependent problems is foolish. It creates
more problems, in the long run, than it solves. It keeps pa-
tients in an immature mode, making them recipients of
treatment instead of agents that take care of themselves.
Side effects of medications taken over a long period of
time amass and create new “diseases” as side effects [27],
apart from the fact that we have not enough data to sup-
port such prescriptions in most cases [28]. And it prevents
the change to a different narrative that has a chance of
turning the tide for chronic and functional problems,
namely a focus on lifestyle, nutrition and simple actions.
To go back to our example of back pain: Of course
one can use the patient narrative and keep taking
NSAIDs or see an acupuncturist or physiotherapist, as
many people do. This will likely reduce symptom load a
bit, and the costs are massive: NSAIDs are the class of
drugs with the single most deaths related to side effects
[16, 29] and the economic burden of back pain is huge
[22]. As an alternative one can switch to the agent
narrative: One might then reconsider lifestyle choices,
perhaps include some regular exercise into one’s life, or
spending more time outdoors walking, biking or just
playing, eating healthier and sorting social problems at
work or at home proactively. And this is only part of
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single best practice, because agency also implies indi-
viduality. Everyone needs to do his or her own assess-
ment, or the doctor with them, in shared decision
making.
The benefit of the new narrative
The powerful change with the agent narrative occurs on
various levels:
 It introduces new, and likely more important,
aspects into patient care and shifts the focus from
treatment to prevention. Lifestyle choices are for the
long haul and no quick fixes.
 It harnesses the patients’ motivation, and turning
patients into agents will bank on their agency and
responsibility.
 It prevents a multitude of likely unnecessary and
very often harmful treatments that more often than
not come out of our preconception that the patient
narrative is without alternatives, rather than positive
evidence that they work well and without side
effects.
It shifts research efforts, conceptual and empirical, from
“treating” and “battling” diseases and their purported
“mechanisms” to understanding complex contributing fac-
tors and their interplay, from basic to applied-clinical, from
isolated clinical to public health sectors.
Table 1 presents some further examples that could easily
be elaborated but serve here the purpose of illustration.
(Other diseases could be used, but we include these
examples to illustrate the implications of the new narrative
for practice.)
Let us close with one pertinent example, Alzheimer’s
disease and dementia.Table 1 Examples of How Changing the Narrative Might Effect Prac
The Evidence Base on Agent Narrative Based Practices Is Small Due
Disease Patient Narrative Age
Cardiovascular disease Take drugs, avoid saturated fat and salt;
surgery to prevent stenosis
Reco
stre
psyc
Rheumatoid arthritis Control inflammation, use disease
modifying agents
Che
veg
supp
Attention Deficit &
Hyperactivity Disorder
Give dopamine agonists like ritalin Che
ove
[65]
(to i
Mild Cognitive Impairment Watchful waiting, consider cholinesterase
inhibitors, if deterioration is obvious
Prev
mor
seek
supp
and
[30,The patient-narrative approach to dementia runs some-
what like this (We are using Alzheimer’s as an example; it
can be adapted to many other diseases or other types of
dementia; see Table 1) [30]: The true causes of Alzheimer’s
are unknown, but occur likely earlier in life, and are
probably associated with various genetic risk factors that
cannot be tackled. But what can and should be tackled are
the likely pathological causes, such as the decay of the cho-
linergic system, the preponderance of amyloid beta plaques,
neurofibrillary tangles and phosphorylated tau. So let’s
understand this pathology better in order to be able to fix
it, for instance with an inoculation, or by blocking some
receptor or enzyme pathways. This would be good for
everybody: patients could be treated, there would be the
magic bullet everyone is waiting for at the end of the tunnel,
and it would be good for the industry, because there will be
a new blockbuster drug worth multi-billions of dollars.
The problem with this narrative is: it is very likely the
wrong approach.
This is a good example of how the wrong narrative di-
verts our resources to inefficient roads [30, 31]. There
have been some 81 or so substances in the pipeline of
the industry, only some four of which, dependent on the
countries, have made it to market [32]. None of these
medications changes the course of the disease middle or
long-term. They all only alleviate symptoms, if they do
anything at all, at very high cost and with considerable
side effects [33]. The inoculation approaches have been
halted [32]. They worked well in animals on a mechanis-
tic level but without changing the clinical outcome [34].
Many hundreds of billions of dollars have been
invested in development, with very little progress
[30]. All Alzheimer societies still give out prizes for
finding the magic drug, the new breakthrough, which
is very unlikely to occur. This is, because the presup-
positions are likely wrong.tice: Therapeutic Options Derived From Various Narratives; Note:
to a Lack of Interest
nt Narrative
nsider lifestyle choices [18], individualized nutrition program [52–54],
ss-reduction, meditation and mindfulness, exercise [55, 56], consider
hosocial aspects and personal relationships [57, 58]
ck on nutritional antigens, consider fasting and an individually adapted
etarian diet [59–61]; consider checking omega-3 to omega-6 ratio and
lementing, if low to reduce inflammatory propensity [62, 63]
ck out social environment, nutritional and lifestyle patterns like
rstimulation (caffeine, TV, media); [64] consider mindfulness practice;
check on omega-3 to omega-6 balance and consider supplementing
mprove neuroplasticity and learning) [66]
ent medicalisation [30], consider changing dietary pattern towards
e ketogenic intake avoiding sugars and simple carbohydrates [37, 38, 53],
out cognitive stimulation [67], exercise [33], going into the sun and/or
lementing vitamin D [44, 45, 68], enhance social participation, contacts
volunteer work in the community, accept aging as a natural process
46]
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are different. Here we suppose that the causes are multifac-
torial and likely also part of the human condition of getting
old, i.e. Alzheimer’s is is not primarily a medical disease but
a complex human condition. Perhaps if we all were to live
to see 200 years we’d be all demented? We do not know.
But at any rate, brain aging is a natural process that likely
will occur more quickly in some people than in others, and
some parts of it may be actually slowed down or diverted
by preventive lifestyle measures [35]. Do we know? Not
directly, because there have been very few resources to
study this approach, precisely because of the dominance of
the patient-narrative. But there are some indirect pieces of
evidence. Some variance might be explained by the increa-
sing amount of mercury from industrial and dental sources
to which our societies are exposed [36]. This leads to sele-
nium scavenging, because selenium is used by the body to
bind mercury into the inactive mercury selenite, and thus
deprives the body of its selenium resources. Most antioxi-
dative enzymes in the body and in the brain are selenium
based. So this process triggers a long term selenium defi-
ciency which at one point might derail into an inflamma-
tory cascade. Then there is the potential insulin resistance
of neurons that have been exposed to high levels of sugar
for a long time and that might make them ill functioning
[37, 38]. There is the public health issue of a long term and
population wide change in the omega-3 to − 6 ratio due to
the shift in the fat profiles in our food. That shift reduces
the availability of omega-3, which is necessary for axonal
growth, neuro-neogenesis and downregulation of inflam-
matory processes [39–43]. There are other factors such as a
lack of vitamin D [44, 45], a lack of social connectivity [46]
and resources, a lack of cognitive activity [47] and physical
exercise [33], and very likely they all combine. And all of
those factors feed into a preventive model of dementia that
makes the future patient a present agent who can do some-
thing to increase his or her chance of living a healthier life
for longer [35].A note of caution
There is no promise of perfect health, no promise of a ban
on suffering, as seems to be the driver of the patient narra-
tive, but but a focus on agency, empowerment, self-efficacy,
and self-fulfillment is promising. Calls for a new narrative
recognize that promise and are increasing. [2].
What are the dangers of the narrative of agency? When
many hear “agency” and “responsibility”, they think “guilt”.
Certainly the term “responsibility” has been used in a way
that strongly suggests guilt or culpability in some political
discussions of health, with commentators – including
government spokespersons – implying that patients whose
“lifestyle choices” are causally responsible for their current
medical conditions should be “de-prioritized” when decisionsare made about making drugs and other forms of publicly
funded medical treatment available [48–50].
While there may be economic or political agendas
which make it attractive for some to link the promotion
of “personal responsibility” for one’s health to the with-
drawal of medical treatment for those deemed to have
made “risky” or otherwise “unhealthy” choices, there is
no logical link between the call for a new narrative of
agency and such punitive measures. To treat someone as
an agent is to attempt to understand the reasons for
their actions in the context of their whole lives [51], with
the goal of supporting them in making decisions that
they will find benefit them in the future. Efforts to single
out whole groups of patients (be they “smokers”, “drug
addicts” or “the overweight”) for “de-prioritization”
based on their supposedly irresponsible choices,
oversimplify the complexity, diversity and individuality
of human lives and, as such, are insensitive to the
context-specific nature of rational, responsible choice
that we have emphasized in this paper. The issues
regarding the relationship between social factors,
rationality and individual choice in context are com-
plex. A choice that is risky in some respect might
well be rational and right in other situations [50].
There is no logical or scientific basis for refusing to
treat sports injuries of high risk sports on the
grounds that the injured sportsperson “knew the
risks” associated with an activity that also provided
perceptible health benefits. Nor is there any simple,
logical move from the ascription of causal to moral
responsibility for a medical condition [42, 43]. (If
there were, then the sportsperson who did indeed
“know the risks” of sporting activity would automatic-
ally be held morally accountable for injuries arising in
the course of activities that most credible health
professionals would positively recommend. Such a
view is patently indefensible.) The narrative of agency
is a means of helping people avoid becoming patients,
not an ad hoc rationale for penalizing those who are
patients, as we will all be, at some point.
Our argument has been based on the evidence that a
new narrative of agency is needed and beneficial. Our
plea is that changing part of the narrative from patient
to agent will be to the benefit of patients, or rather,
agents, and doctors, as well as society. So let us gently
convert patients into agents.
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